![\"North](\"http:\/\/www.eastasiaforum.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/02\/2019-01-10T061320Z_965843606_RC1651AE2F60_RTRMADP_3_NORTHKOREA-CHINA-400x267.jpg\")
<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\nIt is not clear whether this shift in the strategic community is a state-directed initiative to shape the broader Chinese policy community\u2019s narrative. It is also not clear whether this view is consistent with the internal conclusion of the Chinese government on the matter. But what is clear is that this view corroborates with the Chinese government\u2019s approach to North Korea. China\u2019s current North Korea policy is premised on the notion that Kim is bona-fide committed to denuclearisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Kim\u2019s latest meeting with Xi in January 2019, he told Xi that North Korea will continue to adhere to its denuclearisation stance. Did Xi have confidence in Kim\u2019s words?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Reportedly, Xi, being an ostensibly socialist leader, decided to trust Kim. Xi treated Kim like family during his stay in Beijing, arranging a private lunch with Xi\u2019s wife Peng Liyuan and Kim\u2019s wife Ri Sol-ju. They conversed over tea and went through photos taken from the previous visits. The venue was the historic Beijing Hotel where Kim\u2019s grandfather Kim Il-sung used to meet with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decades ago. It would be unthinkable for Kim to lie to Xi, the logic goes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This may be a Chinese way of rationalising why Kim is serious about denuclearisation. At any rate, the consequence is that it sets free Xi from his \u2018self-imposed\u2019 restraint of not meeting with Kim. In the past, Xi refused to visit North Korea due to its nuclear development. North Korea\u2019s nuclear weapons were also the reason for China to join the United States in slapping UN-mandated economic sanctions on North Korea. Kim\u2019s expression of willingness for denuclearisation removed the barrier for the two to finally meet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There is an ongoing debate over whether China is using the \u2018North Korea card\u2019 in its dealings with Washington, including in its trade negotiations with the United States, amid deepening rivalry and competition between the two superpowers. China is seen as the country that has the largest influence<\/a> over North Korea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China will not be in attendance at the Trump\u2013Kim summit in Hanoi, but its presence will be felt<\/a>. North Korea seems to be emitting a renewed sense of confidence in dealing with the United States since Kim\u2019s fourth meeting with Xi in January, in which they agreed to deal with the nuclear negotiation with the United States through \u2018joint research and coordination\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also makes sense for Kim to use China to hedge against the possibility of slow progress with the United States by making sure that he maintains good relations with Xi.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During Kim\u2019s 2019 new year speech<\/a>, he said he will closely consult \u2018parties to the Korean War armistice\u2019 to transform the armistice state to the peace state. China was implied without being named. It is Kim\u2019s invitation for China to play a more active role in North Korea\u2019s negotiations with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China can use its influence with North Korea in a positive or a negative way. On the one hand, it can help Washington by nudging North Korea toward denuclearisation. On the other hand, it can play the role of a \u2018spoiler\u2019 by advising Kim to cool off his warming relations with Trump. Trump has already openly complained, at least three times, that China was behind North Korea\u2019s defiant attitude that led to the negotiations being stalled in 2018.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Will the same thing happen again at the Hanoi summit? This concern has been raised in numerous international policy discussions about North Korea lately. Already there is pessimism about the expected outcome of the Trump\u2013Kim summit, especially among the Washington elite.<\/p>\n\n\n\n North Korea\u2019s denuclearisation is not Xi\u2019s most immediate policy priority. China\u2019s paramount priority is to \u2018soft land\u2019 the ongoing trade war with Washington. As such, China may use its leverage with North Korea to nudge Kim to be more forthcoming in denuclearisation measures. Xi could then present this as a goodwill sign of China\u2019s cooperation with the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fitting to this speculation, China\u2019s Foreign Ministry said Kim told Xi<\/a> during their January meet that he would make an effort to have the second Trump\u2013Kim summit produce \u2018results the international community will welcome\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Washington maintains that the trade war<\/a> (between the United States and China) and the denuclearisation negotiations (between the United States and North Korea) are separate matters. But we should remember that Trump, upon inauguration, proposed to China that he would be willing to be soft on China on trade if China cooperates on the North Korean issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is unwarranted to conclude that Xi will again turn out to be a spoiler. We should be open to the possibility that China this time may turn out to be a positive force in mediating between Pyongyang and Washington. At the minimum, China doesn\u2019t want to be finger-pointed if the talks yield less-than satisfying results, so it is keeping a low-profile. Since Chinese President Xi Jinping\u2019s first summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in March 2018, the mainstream view in China\u2019s strategic community has evolved. China has gradually come to embrace the notion that Kim\u2019s denuclearisation diplomacy is a genuine strategic shift, not a tactical manoeuvre. It is not clear whether this shift in the strategic community is a state-directed… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":92,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3163","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3163","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/92"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3163"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3163\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3164,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3163\/revisions\/3164"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3163"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3163"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/eastasiaandoceaniablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3163"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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