{"id":4324,"date":"2020-02-13T19:57:52","date_gmt":"2020-02-13T19:57:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/?p=4324"},"modified":"2020-02-13T19:57:52","modified_gmt":"2020-02-13T19:57:52","slug":"what-sinn-feins-election-success-means-for-irish-relations-with-the-eu-and-brexit","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/2020\/02\/13\/what-sinn-feins-election-success-means-for-irish-relations-with-the-eu-and-brexit\/","title":{"rendered":"What Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s election success means for Irish relations with the EU \u2013 and Brexit"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Ireland\u2019s traditionally centre-right conservative political system has been rocked by a wave of support for Sinn F\u00e9in in the February 8 general election. The previously small left-wing republican party with historic links to the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army, now has legitimate ambitions<\/a> to form part of the next Irish government in coalition with other parties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Political hostility, historical antipathy and considerable incompatibility on both policies and principles sullies the relationships between Sinn F\u00e9in and Ireland\u2019s two other largest parties, Fianna F\u00e1il and Fine Gael. While they are reluctant to share power with Sinn F\u00e9in, the current political arithmetic of the new parliament suggests the next Irish government will require its participation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So what does this mean for Ireland\u2019s relationship with the EU, and its upcoming post-Brexit trade negotiations with the UK?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Traditionally Eurosceptic<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Decidedly to the left of the political spectrum, Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s position on the EU has shifted over time. In its early days, the party was ardently anti-EU. For reasons of both national sovereignty and anti-capitalism, Sinn F\u00e9in stridently opposed<\/a> Irish membership of the EU in 1973.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the intervening years, the benefits of EU membership for Ireland were not lost on Sinn F\u00e9in. Membership of the single European market, access to the Common Agricultural Policy, structural fund assistance, and EU support<\/a> for the Northern Ireland peace process led to some moderation of the party\u2019s original objections to the EU. Ongoing opposition<\/a> to closer and deeper EU integration was nonetheless evident. The party campaigned against various EU treaty reforms, including Maastricht, Nice<\/a> and Lisbon<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s decision to support and campaign for Remain<\/a> during the UK\u2019s 2016 referendum on EU membership might appear out of sync with its soft euroscepticism, however, this position was largely motivated by homegrown political and constitutional concerns. Sinn F\u00e9in was concerned that a UK exit from the EU could undermine north-south relations on the island of Ireland \u2013 a particularly important outcome of the peace process for Irish nationalists. There were also concerns that a UK decision to leave the EU would re-policitise the Irish border and destabilise politics and community relations in Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Motivated by Northern Ireland\u2019s 56% vote in favour of Remain, the party argued vociferously against any Brexit deal which threatened to re-impose a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Sinn F\u00e9in position was supported by a strongly supportive EU and its chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, consistently maintained<\/a> that: \u201cIreland\u2019s interest is the EU\u2019s interest\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Republic of Ireland, a striking level of cross-party consensus has defined Ireland\u2019s approach to Brexit. All Irish political parties, including Sinn F\u00e9in, supported the approach to Brexit taken by Fine Gael-led governments. Testament to this is the fact that Brexit simply did not feature as an issue during the election campaign. An election\u00a0exit poll<\/a>\u00a0suggested that just 1% of Irish voters were concerned about Brexit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Brexit withdrawal agreement meets Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s central Brexit objective to maintain an open border on the island of Ireland, albeit using a complex formula<\/a> where Northern Ireland is effectively part of the EU for the purposes of customs and free movement of goods.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Demands around Irish unity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

From an Irish perspective, there are two dimensions to the next stage of the process: first, to ensure that the withdrawal agreement\u2019s provisions on Northern Ireland are implemented, and second, to negotiate a future UK-EU relationship that does the least damage. A Sinn F\u00e9in coalition government will maintain an emphasis on protecting Irish interests, but there may be some subtle shifts in priorities, focus and relationships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s core political aim is to achieve Irish unity. Although the issue of unification was not part of the national conversation during the general election campaign, the party\u2019s president, Mary Lou McDonald, highlighted her intention to pursue such an agenda on the back of the party\u2019s extraordinary election performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

She is seeking European support and explicitly suggested<\/a> in a BBC interview that: \u201cThe EU needs to take a stand in respect of Ireland in the same way that it supported the reunification of Germany.\u201d This position has the potential to complicate and frustrate Ireland\u2019s EU partners who will not welcome being dragged into what are domestic political and constitutional matters for Ireland and the UK.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s position will also antagonise the British government and may taint the UK-EU negotiating atmosphere. Any further hardening of the intention of the UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, to diverge from EU rules would complicate the implementation<\/a> of the new arrangements for Northern Ireland and its border with the Republic of Ireland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the extent of Sinn F\u00e9in\u2019s influence in any future Irish government should not be overstated. The party is unlikely to be the largest partner in any coalition so its rhetoric and positions on a whole raft of policies will necessarily have to moderate. It\u2019s also doubtful that Sinn F\u00e9in would hold all (if any) of the key Brexit-related ministries such as foreign affairs, finance or European affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The backbone of Ireland\u2019s Brexit effort \u2013 the Irish civil service \u2013 will continue to direct and manage Ireland\u2019s approach to the EU. And a strongly pro-EU Irish public<\/a> will not want to see the Ireland-EU relationship jeopardised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The 2020 general election in Ireland has interrupted the country\u2019s political equilibrium. New political forces, agendas and voices are now set to be part of the next Irish government. This will require some adjustment and perhaps a degree of reorientation, but political, institutional and other factors will ensure that key features and characteristics of the Ireland-EU relationship endure.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Ireland\u2019s traditionally centre-right conservative political system has been rocked by a wave of support for Sinn F\u00e9in in the February 8 general election. The previously small left-wing republican party with historic links to the paramilitary Provisional Irish Republican Army, now has legitimate ambitions to form part of the next Irish government in coalition with other parties. Political hostility, historical antipathy and considerable… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":146,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4324","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4324","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/146"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4324"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4324\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4325,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4324\/revisions\/4325"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4324"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4324"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/europeandrussiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4324"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}