\n\nDespite its regional outreach, Kazakhstan\u2019s diplomatic priority will remain Russia, China, and Europe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Leaders of the resource-rich Central Asian region have the propensity to remain in power until mortality dictates otherwise. Much like the UK and Brexit, however, few wanted to see Central Asia\u2019s longest reigning ruler, Kazakhstan\u2019s septuagenarian president Nursultan Nazarbayev, crash out without a deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The sudden departure of the country\u2019s official leader of the nation with no clear succession plan could have led to investment chaos, intra-elite fighting and the unravelling in a matter of months of a system he had built over decades, \u00e0 la Uzbekistan following the death of long-serving autocrat Islam Karimov in 2016.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In order to avoid just such a \u2018no-deal\u2019 scenario and ensure the continuity of his policies, in March Nazarbayev carefully choreographed his own resignation and the election of a hand-picked successor, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, while retaining plum positions and powers for himself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Tokayev\u2019s assumption of the presidency was accompanied by protesters in the streets, increasing wealth inequality, rising Sinophobia among rank-and-file Kazakhstanis, a hard-to-kick economic dependence on oil revenues and a lack of clarity as to which leader\u2014the old or the new president\u2014would actually be calling the shots. But, amidst this plethora of concerns, as argued in a recent Chatham House report, Kazakhstan: Tested by Transition<\/em><\/a>, one bright spot has been the tangible growth of intra-Central Asian cooperation, with the Nazarbayev-Tokayev ruling duo appearing eager to improve the regional dialogue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kazakhstan has long shaped its identity as a Eurasian state that has acted as more of an intermediary between Russia and Central Asia than as an integral part of the Central Asian region. But since 2017, in particular, Kazakhstan has been increasingly looking for opportunities to boost hitherto weak cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours. While this is first and foremost owing to the liberalization of Uzbekistan\u2019s large market, there are other factors at work that get less airplay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One such factor is a perceptible disentangling from the Kremlin\u2019s policy directions as Kazakhstan has come to view Russia\u2019s foreign policy as increasingly neo-colonial. The example of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union is in many respects more off-putting than inspiring, and Nur-Sultan does not want to be locked tightly into the union\u2019s economic orbit. And in distancing itself slightly from Moscow in order to limit Russian leverage in its affairs, Nur-Sultan has shown itself to be more open to Central Asian regional initiatives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As part of the leadership\u2019s plan to offset oil dependence, Kazakhstan aspires to become the transport, telecommunications and investment hub for Eurasian integration. The intense focus on connectivity and the development of logistical arteries and infrastructure could have the knock-on effect of boosting trade within the Central Asian region and reducing transit times, which are currently greater than in most other parts of the globe.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, demographic trends and educational shifts that favour ethnic Kazakhs, together with a growing ethno-nationalist narrative, have allowed the state\u2019s leadership to identify more closely with Kazakhstan\u2019s common Central Asian heritage and, by extension, a common Central Asian region\u2014although Kazakhstan\u2019s leadership still remains eager to demonstrate that the country is not just another \u2018stan\u2019. The coming to power of President Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan appears to have made Kazakhstan more aware of the interconnectedness of the two countries in terms of geographical location and potential economic complementarities, as well as culture and history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Not least, there is a growing recognition among the Central Asian states themselves\u2014including isolationist Turkmenistan to a degree\u2014that deepening regional trade is mutually beneficial, especially given the constraints associated with Russia\u2019s economic problems. The strengthening of Kazakhstan\u2019s ties with Uzbekistan has slowly kick-started regional cooperation as a whole: trade turnover between the Central Asian states in 2018 grew by 35 per cent on the previous year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are keen to stress that there is no discussion of integration or institutionalization, not least because previous attempts at integration have been overtaken by Russia, leaving Central Asia without its own coordinating body.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The official consensus in Kazakhstan is that Uzbekistan\u2019s economic reforms after years of isolation will spur \u2018a healthy rivalry\u2019 and ultimately boost Kazakhstan\u2019s own economy, in so far as the competition for foreign investment will require both countries to work harder to improve their respective business and regulatory environments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the unofficial level, however, some Kazakhstani analysts view Uzbekistan\u2019s rise as potentially unprofitable, given the possible diversion of some investments and market activity from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbekistan has the advantage of having undergone a clear change of executive, while it remains unclear which developments await Kazakhstan once First President Nazarbayev leaves the scene for good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It can certainly be argued that Uzbekistan does pose a potential threat in the long-term to Kazakhstan\u2019s entrenched position as Central Asia\u2019s economic powerhouse: Uzbekistan\u2019s population is one-and-a-half times bigger, even if its nominal GDP is three times smaller. Uzbekistan has a bigger market and a well-developed industrial sector, and is already the regional leader in terms of security. But it is not as though the world\u2019s interest is moving from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan; rather, Uzbekistan is in the process of trying to catch up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite this relatively upbeat picture, Kazakhstan\u2019s combined trade with the other Central Asian states accounts for less than 5 per cent of its total volume of foreign trade\u2014a figure that cannot begin to equal its trade with Russia, China, and Europe. As a result, Kazakhstan will continue to give greater importance to positioning itself as a global player than as a regional leader.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Despite its regional outreach, Kazakhstan\u2019s diplomatic priority will remain Russia, China, and Europe. Leaders of the resource-rich Central Asian region have the propensity to remain in power until mortality dictates otherwise. Much like the UK and Brexit, however, few wanted to see Central Asia\u2019s longest reigning ruler, Kazakhstan\u2019s septuagenarian president Nursultan Nazarbayev, crash out without a deal. The sudden departure… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":138,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3916","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article-post"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3916","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/138"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3916"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3916\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3917,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3916\/revisions\/3917"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3916"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3916"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3916"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}