{"id":4335,"date":"2021-01-15T00:50:58","date_gmt":"2021-01-15T00:50:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/?p=4335"},"modified":"2021-01-15T00:50:58","modified_gmt":"2021-01-15T00:50:58","slug":"sri-lanka-revives-port-deal-with-india-japan-amid-china-concerns","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/2021\/01\/15\/sri-lanka-revives-port-deal-with-india-japan-amid-china-concerns\/","title":{"rendered":"Sri Lanka revives port deal with India, Japan amid China concerns"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Link<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

India and Japan are once again engaging with Sri Lanka in a developmental investment to construct a deep water port in Colombo, previously put on hold in 2019 due to union and fair pay upheavals. Sri Lanka will hold a majority share of the port, while Japan and India will hold partial ownership as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The establishment of the investment project comes in response to a Chinese expansion of their sphere of influence into the Indian Ocean. In 2014, China loaned a massive amount of money to Sri Lanka and bought a shipping container berch in Colombo. Three years later, Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan and forfeited an eastern deep water port. The concern of a deep water port is, of course, its potential to be used as a southern naval foothold for China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This strategy China used to gain access to the port is essentially debt trapping, and it’s commonplace among Chinese diplomacy plans. China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti by loaning over 80% Djiboutian GDP and finding leverage when purchasing developed land. China has also most notably used this strategy in Pakistan, Ecuador, and Malaysia– all important geostrategic locations for the new global power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

India has lately been adopting a “neighborhood first” policy, whereby they have promoted regional solidarity among their allies and trading partners, largely against a mounting Chinese threat to their own development. Just last week, India announced they would be distributing Indian-made Coronavirus vaccinations to Sri Lanka first, enabling a quicker recovery for both states and strengthening relations previously scarred by civil war and regime change. To Sri Lanka, Indian help could not come at a better time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This problem is all about bipolar geostrategy: as China wedges influence into the Indian Ocean, its rivals seek to protect their networks of trade and freer diplomacy. India especially as expressed concern over this development in Sri Lanka, as they had previously only had to worry about securing their Chinese border; an Indian navy doesn’t quite scale to the potential China may have to pressure the vast Indian coastline, whether in conflict or protecting trade. The US has also expressed concern over the control of Sri Lankan port, as much US trade has went through India, alongside a number of outstanding deals we’ve made to strengthen ties investing in India over the last 4-10 years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Japan’s interest in securing Sri Lanka for the West has been made explicitly clear by their Foreign Minister: their objective is “to develop free and open maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region as an international public good.” Japan has also recently invested heavily in an eastern Sri Lankan port, aiming to contest the perceived Chinese occupation. Colombo and Sri Lanka altogether risk becoming an economic battleground between Chinese and Western-aligned actors, although the polar power, the US, is reluctant to directly intervene in the conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Link India and Japan are once again engaging with Sri Lanka in a developmental investment to construct a deep water port in Colombo, previously put on hold in 2019 due to union and fair pay upheavals. Sri Lanka will hold a majority share of the port, while Japan and India will hold partial ownership as well. The establishment of the… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":174,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4335","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis-post"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4335","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/174"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4335"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4335\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4337,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4335\/revisions\/4337"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4335"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4335"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4335"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}