{"id":6084,"date":"2024-11-17T00:29:09","date_gmt":"2024-11-17T00:29:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/?p=6084"},"modified":"2024-11-17T00:29:09","modified_gmt":"2024-11-17T00:29:09","slug":"afghanistan-is-india-warming-up-to-taliban","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/2024\/11\/17\/afghanistan-is-india-warming-up-to-taliban\/","title":{"rendered":"Afghanistan: Is India warming up to Taliban?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Article: Afghanistan: Is India warming up to Taliban?<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This article shares that India is making efforts to get closer to the Taliban and rekindle old alliances\/relations India had with the Central Asian country before the Taliban took over in August of 2021. India has sent an envoy\/diplomat to Afghanistan, although they have not made official statements about this even though the Taliban has. Overall, India is trying to keep this interaction on the low whereas the Taliban have been pretty public about it. There are mutual benefits to closer relations between both countries, but considering that the current Taliban-run-Afghanistan is not internationally recognized by any country, India needs to tread carefully so as to not seem too buddy-buddy with the terrorist organization who breaches international law. The article goes deeper into how India forming closer relations with Afghanistan could erupt in trade opportunities for both countries, specifically allowing for an official trading relations throughout Central Asia for India, given that India has only had limited trading opportunities in the past. I think closer relations between the two countries is a very good step for Afghanistan, especially in gaining some semblance of international recognition, but it is for this exact reason that India must tread carefully. The US and west have deemed Afghanistan a non-issue as the article cites, and if India were to internationally recognize the central asian state, (which is unlikely,) they would lose relations to the west\/US who they rely heavily on in terms of investments and technology. Another hindrance to India forming closer relations with the Taliban is Pakistan, given that it is right between the two countries geographically and blocks India from direct contact with Afghanistan. On the other hand however, Pakistan also enables closer relations to India, since Pakistan-Taliban relations have greatly soured in the last decade, this gives the larger south asian power room to ease up with the Taliban. Ultimately, from Afghanistan\u2019s perspective, a stronger alliance with India offers many benefits as they are the fifth largest economic power, they can offer lots of humanitarian support, and even potential international legitimacy (but not full recognition.) For India however, there are various hindrances that leave them having to tread carefully in easing up to the central asian state. India\u2019s careful principals in easing up to the Taliban remind me of the characteristics of the status quo powers in realism. India doesn’t want to upset the US dominating international system, and this affects the extent to which they wish to become closer with Afghanistan. India will never become full allies with Afghanistan\/Taliban, but they do seek benefits from becoming generally closer. This careful approach ultimately backs and adheres to the current status-quo powers and unipolar balance of power in the international system.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Article: Afghanistan: Is India warming up to Taliban? This article shares that India is making efforts to get closer to the Taliban and rekindle old alliances\/relations India had with the Central Asian country before the Taliban took over in August of 2021. India has sent an envoy\/diplomat to Afghanistan, although they have not made official statements about this even though… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":271,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6084","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-analysis-post"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6084","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/271"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6084"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6084\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6085,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6084\/revisions\/6085"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6084"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6084"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/southandcentralasiablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6084"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}