{"id":1277,"date":"2018-01-11T13:33:29","date_gmt":"2018-01-11T13:33:29","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/?p=1277"},"modified":"2018-01-11T13:33:29","modified_gmt":"2018-01-11T13:33:29","slug":"border-dispute","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/2018\/01\/11\/border-dispute\/","title":{"rendered":"border dispute"},"content":{"rendered":"

Hala’ib Triangle border dispute\u00a0<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The Hala’ib Triangle is an area of land of just under 20,500 square kilometres on the Egyptian-Sudanese border, which both countries have claim over since Sudan gained independence from Egypt in 1956. In the 1990s, Egypt deployed its military in the territory, but, in the following two decades, the dispute was somewhat frozen.<\/p>\n

In 2016, it flared up again. That year, Cairo signed a controversial agreement with Riyadh to hand over two strategically important Red Sea islands – Tiran and Sanafir – to Saudi Arabia. The agreement, which redrew the maritime border between the two countries, also unilaterally recognised Egypt’s sovereignty over the Hala’ib Triangle.<\/p>\n

OPINION<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/span>Why is Sudan off the ‘Muslim ban’ but Chad is on it?<\/a><\/h4>\n
\n
\"Nisrin<\/a><\/div>\n
by\u00a0Nisrin Elamin<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

In December last year, Sudan sent a letter to the UN declaring its total rejection of the deal. Egyptian officials swiftly condemned the letter and reiterated that the triangle is “Egyptian territory”.<\/p>\n

In response, Sudan\u00a0recalled its ambassador<\/a>\u00a0from Cairo\u00a0for consultations on January 4.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, in what may have been a response to Sudan’s renewed claims over the Hala’ib Triangle, as well as fears that Turkey is expanding its influence in the region, Egypt sent hundreds of its troops to a UAE base in\u00a0Eritrea<\/a>, on the border with Sudan.<\/p>\n

Egypt denied any military presence in Eritrea, but the damage was done. Days later, Sudan shut its border with Eritrea and deployed thousands of troops there.<\/p>\n

There are indications that Khartoum is actually trying to escalate the ongoing confrontation with Egypt, in order to exploit the nationalist sentiments of the Sudanese people and divert attention from the country’s grave internal problems – particularly the current protests over\u00a0the new austerity\u00a0budget and the\u00a0increase of\u00a0the price of bread and other basic goods. However, Egypt may be inclined to de-escalate until after its presidential elections later this year.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Hala’ib Triangle border dispute\u00a0 The Hala’ib Triangle is an area of land of just under 20,500 square kilometres on the Egyptian-Sudanese border, which both countries have claim over since Sudan gained independence from Egypt in 1956. In the 1990s, Egypt deployed its military in the territory, but, in the following two decades, the dispute was somewhat frozen. In 2016, it… Read more »<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1277","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1277","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/55"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1277"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1277\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1278,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1277\/revisions\/1278"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1277"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1277"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/subsaharanafricablog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1277"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}