{"id":1358,"date":"2018-02-22T17:08:33","date_gmt":"2018-02-22T17:08:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/?p=1358"},"modified":"2018-02-22T17:08:33","modified_gmt":"2018-02-22T17:08:33","slug":"maduro-trying-to-keep-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/2018\/02\/22\/maduro-trying-to-keep-power\/","title":{"rendered":"Maduro trying to keep power"},"content":{"rendered":"<h1>economist<\/h1>\n<h1 class=\"flytitle-and-title__body\"><span class=\"flytitle-and-title__title\">Nicol\u00e1s Maduro tries to make thugocracy permanent in Venezuela<\/span><\/h1>\n<p class=\"blog-post__rubric\">An unpopular regime\u2019s attempt to impose dictatorship could end bloodily<\/p>\n<div class=\"blog-post__inner\">\n<div class=\"component-image blog-post__image\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image__img blog-post__image-block\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.static-economist.com\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/print-edition\/20170729_FBP001_0.jpg\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<div class=\"blog-post__asideable-wrapper\">\n<div class=\"blog-post__asideable-content blog-post__asideable-content--meta\">\n<div class=\"blog-post__section-date-author\">\n<h3 class=\"blog-post__section\">\u00a0Print edition\u00a0| Briefing<\/h3>\n<p>Jul 29th 2017<span class=\"blog-post__location-created\">| CARACAS<\/span><\/div>\n<div class=\"blog-post__sharebar\">\n<div class=\"share-component\">\n<div class=\"share-component__icons\">\n<div class=\"share__icon share__icon--twitter\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"share__icon share__icon--facebook\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"share__icon share__icon--linkedin\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"share__icon share__icon--mail\"><\/div>\n<div class=\"share__icon share__icon--print\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"blog-post__text\">\n<p>IT COULD almost be a piece of contemporary art, rather than a tool of political struggle. Overlooked by a mango tree heavy with blushing fruit, a rope is strung across Avenida Sucre as it climbs through a comfortable middle-class area towards the forested slopes of Monte \u00c1vila overlooking Caracas. Arranged beneath it are two distressed wooden beams, two pallets placed vertically, a wheel hub, a rusting metal housing for an electric transformer and several tree branches. They form a flimsy barricade watched over by a couple of dozen local residents.<\/p>\n<p>Why are they blockading their own street? \u201cBecause we want this government to go,\u201d explained Mar\u00eda Antonieta Viso, the owner of a catering firm. They were taking part in a 24-hour \u201ccivic strike\u201d on July 20th, called by the opposition coalition, Democratic Unity (MUD, from its initials in Spanish). Down the hill, across innumerable such roadblocks, the sting of tear gas signalled clashes between demonstrators and the National Guard, a militarised police force. The strike, repeated this week, was part of \u201cZero Hour\u201d\u2014a campaign of civil disobedience aimed at blocking a plan by Nicol\u00e1s Maduro, Venezuela\u2019s president, to install a constituent assembly with absolute powers.<\/p>\n<div class=\"newsletter-form newsletter-form--inline\">\n<div class=\"newsletter-form__message\"><strong>Get our daily newsletter<\/strong>Upgrade your inbox and get our Daily Dispatch and Editor&#8217;s Picks.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<form><\/form>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel__container latest-updates-panel__container--blog-post\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel__header latest-updates-panel__header--blog-post\">\n<h2 class=\"latest-updates-panel__label latest-updates-panel__label--blog-post\">Latest stories<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<ul class=\"latest-updates-panel__body\">\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">\u201cIsle of Dogs\u201d lacks bite<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\"><a class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__subtitle\" href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/prospero\">PROSPERO<\/a>3 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">Retail sales, producer prices, wages and exchange rates<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\">3 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">Foreign reserves<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\">3 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">What\u2019s in Poland\u2019s new memory law<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\"><a class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__subtitle\" href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/economist-explains\">THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS<\/a>8 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">Billy Graham\u2019s gentle brand of evangelicalism<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\"><a class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__subtitle\" href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/sections\/united-states\">UNITED STATES<\/a>15 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<li class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__wrapper\">\n<article class=\"latest-updates-panel__article-link\">\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__body\">\n<h3 class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__title\">Infant deaths remain common in the developing world<\/h3>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__footer\"><a class=\"latest-updates-panel-card__subtitle\" href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/blogs\/graphicdetail\">GRAPHIC DETAIL<\/a>20 HOURS AGO<\/div>\n<\/article>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"latest-updates-panel__footer latest-updates-panel__footer--blog-post\"><a class=\"link-button link-button-standalone-read-more link-button-small\" role=\"button\" href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/latest-updates\">See more<\/a><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>Mr Maduro claims that the assembly is the \u201conly way to achieve peace\u201d, to provide Venezuelans with social welfare and to defend the country against what he claims is an \u201ceconomic war\u201d launched by America (though he provides no evidence of this). \u201cWhat they are trying to do is to install the Cuban model in this country,\u201d retorts Ms Viso. \u201cWe will all be screwed even if we take to the streets. There won\u2019t be private property, my business will go to the state.\u201d The long battle over power and policy in Venezuela that began when Hugo Ch\u00e1vez was elected president in 1998 has reached a critical point. Both government and opposition believe that they are fighting for survival against a backdrop of a failing economy, rising hunger and anarchy.<\/p>\n<p>Ch\u00e1vez, a former army officer, proclaimed a \u201cBolivarian revolution\u201d, named for Sim\u00f3n Bol\u00edvar, South America\u2019s Venezuelan-born independence hero. He, too, summoned a constituent assembly, which drew up a new constitution and which he used to take control of the judiciary and the electoral authority. For much of his 14 years in power he had the support of most Venezuelans, thanks partly to his charismatic claim to represent a downtrodden majority and to the flaws of an opposition identified with an uncaring elite. But above all the soaring price of oil gave him an unprecedented windfall, some of which he showered on social programmes in the long-neglected\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">ranchos\u00a0<\/em>(shantytowns). A consumption boom, magnified by an overvalued currency, kept the middle class quiescent. He governed at first through a broad coalition of army officers, far-left politicians and intellectuals.<\/p>\n<p>Angered by opposition attempts to unseat him and influenced by Fidel Castro, Ch\u00e1vez pushed Venezuela towards state socialism after 2007. Economic distortions accumulated, along with corruption and debt. Before he died of cancer in 2013, Ch\u00e1vez chose Mr Maduro, a former bus driver and pro-Cuban activist, as his successor.<\/p>\n<p class=\"xhead\">From Ch\u00e1vez to Maduro<\/p>\n<p>Mr Maduro, however, lacks Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s political skills and popular support. And he has had to grapple with the plunge in the oil price. Years of controls and the takeover of more than 1,500 private businesses and many farms mean that Venezuela now produces little except oil, and imports almost everything else. The government is desperate to avoid defaulting on its debt, since that would lead to creditors seizing oil shipments and assets abroad.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"blog-post__inline-image blog-post__inline-image--generic blog-post__inline-image--slim\">\n<div class=\"component-image blog-post__image\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image__img  blog-post-article-image blog-post-article-image__slim\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.static-economist.com\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/print-edition\/20170729_FBC339.png\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<p>Rather than reform the economy, Mr Maduro has simply squeezed it, applying a tourniquet to imports (see chart 1). The government has no clear strategy for external financing, and the fiscal deficit, mainly financed by printing money, is out of control, says Efra\u00edn Vel\u00e1zquez, the president of the National Economic Council, a quasi-official body. The result: \u201cyou can\u2019t have growth and will have a lot of inflation.\u201d Between 2013 and the end of this year, GDP will have contracted by more than 35% (see chart 2). What this means for most Venezuelans is penury.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"blog-post__inline-image blog-post__inline-image--generic blog-post__inline-image--slim\">\n<div class=\"component-image blog-post__image\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image__img  blog-post-article-image blog-post-article-image__slim\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.static-economist.com\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/print-edition\/20170729_FBC337.png\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<p>Near Plaza P\u00e9rez Bonalde, a leafy enclave in the gritty district of Catia in western Caracas, 100 or so people, mainly women, queue up outside a bakery. They hope to get a ration of eight bread rolls for the subsidised price of 1,200 bol\u00edvares (less than $0.15 at the black-market exchange rate). \u201cAt least it\u2019s something, because everything else is so expensive now,\u201d says Sol Cir\u00e9, a mother of two. She is unemployed, having lost her job at a defunct government hypermarket. Her fate stems from a change of government strategy.<\/p>\n<p>Generalised price controls had generated widespread shortages and embarrassingly long queues. Instead, the government has put the army in charge of a subsidised food-distribution system, known as CLAP and modelled on Cuba\u2019s ration book. Up to 30% of families get this dole of staple products regularly, reckons Asdr\u00fabal Oliveros of Ecoanal\u00edtica, an economic consultancy. They are chosen not according to need but according to their political importance to the government.<\/p>\n<p class=\"xhead\">On the breadline<\/p>\n<p>At the same time, the government has relaxed price controls (bread is an exception). In Catia\u2019s main market, which spills into the surrounding streets, food is abundant, but pricey. A chicken costs 7,600 bol\u00edvares and bananas 1,200 a kilo. Most people don\u2019t have dollars to change on the black market: they must live on the minimum wage of 250,000 bol\u00edvares. The result is that four out of five households were poor last year, their income insufficient to cover basic needs, according to a survey by three universities. Medicines remain scarce. Walk down many streets in Caracas and you may be approached by a beggar.<\/p>\n<p>All this has taken a heavy toll on the government\u2019s support. Mr Maduro won only 50.6% of the vote in a presidential election in 2013, a result questioned by his opponent, Henrique Capriles. In a parliamentary election in December 2015 the opposition won a two-thirds majority\u2014enough to censure ministers and change the constitution.<\/p>\n<p>In the government\u2019s eyes, the opposition is bent on overthrowing an elected president\u2014the aim of protests in 2014, after which Leopoldo L\u00f3pez, an opposition leader, was jailed on trumped-up charges. In response, it has resorted to legal chicanery. If Ch\u00e1vez often violated the letter of his own constitution, Mr Maduro tore it up.<\/p>\n<p>Before the new parliament took over, the government used the old one to preserve its control of the supreme court by replacing justices due to retire. The court then unseated three legislators, eliminating the opposition\u2019s two-thirds majority. Mr Maduro has ruled by decree. The tame electoral tribunal quashed an opposition attempt to trigger a referendum to recall the president\u2014a device Ch\u00e1vez put in the constitution. It postponed regional elections due to take place last December.<\/p>\n<p>In March the court issued decrees stripping the parliament of all powers. That seemed to be because foreign investors take more seriously than the government a constitutional provision under which only the parliament can approve foreign loans. Although partially withdrawn, the decrees were the trigger for a confrontation that continues. They opened up fractures in\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavismo<\/em>\u2014notably the public opposition of Luisa Ortega, the attorney-general since 2007 (who had jailed Mr L\u00f3pez). Mr Maduro\u2019s announcement on May 1st that he would convene the constituent assembly intensified both trends.<\/p>\n<p>Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s constitution was drawn up by a democratically elected constituent assembly, convoked by referendum. Mr Maduro is following a script from Mussolini. He has called the assembly by decree. It will have a \u201ccitizen, worker, communal and peasant-farmer\u201d character, he said. What this means is that 181 members will be chosen by government-controlled \u201csectoral\u201d groups such as students, fishermen and unions. Another 364 members will be directly elected, but in gerrymandered fashion: each of Venezuela\u2019s 340 municipalities will choose one. Small towns are under the government\u2019s thumb; cities, where the opposition is a majority, will get only one extra representative.<\/p>\n<p>Datan\u00e1lisis, a reliable pollster, finds that two-thirds of respondents reject the constituent assembly, more than 80% think it unnecessary to change the constitution and only 23% approve of Mr Maduro. At just two weeks\u2019 notice, on July 16th almost 7.5m Venezuelans turned out for an unofficial plebiscite organised by the opposition. Almost all of them voted to reject the assembly, to call on the army to defend the constitution and for a presidential election by next year (when one is due).<\/p>\n<p>Few doubt that the assembly will be a puppet-body and the vote on July 30th, which the opposition will boycott, will be inflated. The government counts on the 4.5m people who are employed in the public sector or in communal bodies. Those who fail to turn out risk losing not just their job but their CLAP food rations. Additional pressure to vote in\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavista\u00a0<\/em>neighbourhoods comes from the\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">colectivos<\/em>\u2014regime-sponsored armed thugs on motorbikes. Officials have said the assembly will not only write a new constitution but will assume supreme power, sacking Ms Ortega and replacing the parliament, whose building it will occupy. It will give Mr Maduro a slightly larger figleaf than the supreme court for a dictatorship of the minority.<\/p>\n<p>Yet the president will find it hard to make this stick. \u201cHow do you govern the country with 75% against you?\u201d asks Mr Capriles. \u201cI think he\u2019s trapped.\u201d For the past four months the opposition has held almost daily protests. These have a ritual quality. To prevent demonstrators reaching the city centre, or blocking the main motorway through Caracas, the National Guard fires volleys of tear gas, buckshot\u2014and occasionally bullets. Younger radicals, known as the \u201cResistance\u201d, press forward, throwing stones from behind makeshift shields. Similar scenes take place across the country. Looting is commonplace. In these clashes, over 100 people have died. More than 400 protesters are now prisoners, including several opposition politicians. After the parliament named 33 justices to a rival supreme court on July 21st, the government arrested three of them.<\/p>\n<p class=\"xhead\">Resistance isn\u2019t futile<\/p>\n<p>Mr Maduro has more worries. The first is his own side.\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">Chavista<\/em>strongholds are wavering. In the bread queue in Catia, several people say they are against the assembly. The opposition managed to set up voting stations for its plebiscite there: at one, a woman died when a\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">colectivo\u00a0<\/em>fired on voters. \u201cSome people have left us and gone over to the other side,\u201d admits a local official. \u201cBut it\u2019s very difficult for a\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavista<\/em>\u00a0to support the opposition,\u201d she adds. Ch\u00e1vez is still viewed favourably by 53% of Venezuelans, according to Datan\u00e1lisis.<\/p>\n<p>Rather, a new movement of \u201ccritical\u201d or \u201cdemocratic\u201d\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavistas<\/em>, including Ms Ortega, several former ministers and recently retired generals, has publicly called for the scrapping of the assembly and the upholding of the constitution. When they held a press conference at a modest hotel on July 21st, some 300 regime supporters outside tried to drown them out with loud music and chants of \u201ctraitors\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>Then there is the army. The regime has co-opted it, turning it into a faction-ridden, politicised and top-heavy moneymaking operation, with more than 2,000 generals (where 200 used to suffice). Mr Maduro has given them control over food imports and distribution, ports and airports, a bank and the mining industry. Many generals have grown rich by buying dollars at the lowest official exchange rate of $1=10 bol\u00edvares, intended for food imports, and selling them at the black market rate of 9,000. Others smuggle petrol or drugs.<\/p>\n<p class=\"xhead\">Murmuring in the ranks<\/p>\n<p>An \u201cundercurrent of muttering\u201d among junior officers is checked by a network of political commissars and snoops installed by Ch\u00e1vez, says Jos\u00e9 Machillanda, of Sim\u00f3n Bol\u00edvar University in Caracas. At the top, several thousand Cuban security personnel guard Mr Maduro and the 30-40 leaders who form the regime\u2019s core.<\/p>\n<p>But the assembly has tested the army\u2019s loyalty to Mr Maduro. He twice reshuffled senior ranks in the past two months. Caracas is alive with rumours of an impending\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">pronunciamento<\/em>, in which the army withdraws its support for the regime.<\/p>\n<p>Another acute threat to Mr Maduro is the economy. The rot has spread to the oil industry, Venezuela\u2019s mainstay. According to OPEC, since 2015 the country\u2019s oil output has fallen by 400,000 barrels per day (or around 17%). This is the long-term price of Ch\u00e1vez\u2019s decision to turn PDVSA, the once efficient state oil company, into an arm of the welfare state.<\/p>\n<p>Foreign-exchange reserves hover around $10bn, according to the Central Bank. Economists expect the government to make $3.5bn in debt payments due in the autumn, but it will struggle to find the $8.5bn it needs to avoid default next year. China, a big paymaster, is reluctant to lend more. Russia may be Mr Maduro\u2019s best hope, but it worries about getting entangled in possible American sanctions against Venezuela.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"blog-post__inline-image blog-post__inline-image--generic blog-post__inline-image--slim\">\n<div class=\"component-image blog-post__image\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image__img  blog-post-article-image blog-post-article-image__slim\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.static-economist.com\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/print-edition\/20170729_FBC978.png\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div>\n<\/figure>\n<p>The fourth problem Mr Maduro faces is that the region has become less friendly to him. Ch\u00e1vez enjoyed the solidarity of other left-wing governments in Latin America. Many are no longer there, or have distanced themselves. Venezuela has been suspended from Mercosur, a trade group; it could be expelled if the assembly goes ahead, says Argentina\u2019s foreign minister. The regime showed that it cares about its standing in the region by the big diplomatic effort it made in June to prevent its suspension from the Organisation of American States.<\/p>\n<p>Many in Caracas assumed that Mr Maduro intended the assembly as a bargaining chip, to be withdrawn in return for concessions by the opposition. If so, he may be trapped by the forces of radicalisation he has unleashed. Diosdado Cabello, a retired army officer who is his chief rival within the regime, appears to see the assembly as his route to power. Back down now, and Mr Maduro risks losing face among his hard-core supporters.<\/p>\n<p>Venezuela thus stands at a junction. One road involves a negotiation that might either fix a calendar for a free and fair election, or that might see Mr Maduro and other regime leaders depart. The opposition is mistrustful after talks brokered by the Vatican and Jos\u00e9 Luis Rodr\u00edguez Zapatero, a former Spanish prime minister, broke down last year when it quickly became clear that the government was not prepared to restore constitutional rule. Mr Zapatero was a conduit for a move that saw Mr L\u00f3pez transferred from prison to house arrest this month. He is in Caracas again this week.<\/p>\n<p>The city hums with rumours of a new mediation effort led by a shifting kaleidoscope of foreign governments. But conditions do not yet seem ripe. \u201cThe government sees the cost of leaving power as very high, that they would be destroyed and persecuted,\u201d reckons Luis Vicente Le\u00f3n of Datan\u00e1lisis. The opposition is suspicious, too. \u201cTo return to political negotiations we have to have real signs that the government is prepared to change,\u201d observes Freddy Guevara, the deputy leader of Mr L\u00f3pez\u2019s party.<\/p>\n<figure class=\"blog-post__inline-image blog-post__inline-image--generic\">\n<div class=\"component-image blog-post__image\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"component-image__img  blog-post-article-image\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.static-economist.com\/sites\/default\/files\/images\/print-edition\/20170729_FBP002_0.jpg\" alt=\"\" \/><\/div><figcaption>Can anyone stop Mr Maduro?<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>That probably requires a military\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">pronunciamento<\/em>. But the army \u201clooks at the opposition and doesn\u2019t see any guarantees that they would be able to run the country\u201d, says a foreign diplomat. The MUD has worked well as an electoral coalition, and its plebiscite was impressive. It has published a programme for a government of national unity. But, crucially, it lacks an agreed leader with a mandate to negotiate. \u201cThe opposition is stuck together with chewing gum,\u201d says Mr Le\u00f3n.<\/p>\n<p class=\"xhead\">Anomie and anarchy<\/p>\n<p>Barring a negotiation, the other route looks bleak. There is a growing sense of anomie and anarchy. On the opposition side, there is desperation in the self-barricading of its own neighbourhoods, an action which does little to hurt the government. Social media have been vital in undermining the regime\u2019s control of information. But they also spread rumours and undermine moderation. Middle-class\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">caraque\u00f1os\u00a0<\/em>are reading books on non-violent resistance. But on the streets many protesters express mistrust for the MUD. The \u201cResistance\u201d is well-organised and trained. It would not be hard for it to take up arms.<\/p>\n<p>For its part, the\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavista\u00a0<\/em>block is splintering. The National Guard now raids properties in\u00a0<em class=\"Italic\">chavista\u00a0<\/em>areas at night, because they are being fired on by disgruntled residents. \u201cThere\u2019s a growing attitude of \u2018don\u2019t mess with me\u2019,\u201d says Mr Machillanda.<\/p>\n<p>Mr Maduro and his core of civilian leftists admire Cuba but they do not command a disciplined revolutionary state, capable of imposing its will across Venezuela\u2019s vast territory. The 100 or so dead in the protests are fewer than are killed each weekend in lawless poor neighbourhoods. The \u201cBolivarian revolution\u201d has created a state run by rival mafias and undermined from within by corruption.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThey could try to Cubanise the country,\u201d says Mr Capriles. \u201cBut whether Venezuelans accept that is another matter.\u201d Given the intensity of Venezuela\u2019s confrontation, it has suffered remarkably little political violence. Sadly, that may now change. If Mr Maduro shuts down all hope of political change, it may take many more deaths to break the deadlock.<\/p>\n<footer class=\"blog-post__foot-note\">This article appeared in the\u00a0Briefing\u00a0section of the print edition under the headline\u00a0&#8220;The mess\u00a0<\/footer>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>economist Nicol\u00e1s Maduro tries to make thugocracy permanent in Venezuela An unpopular regime\u2019s attempt to impose dictatorship could end bloodily \u00a0Print edition\u00a0| Briefing Jul 29th 2017| CARACAS IT COULD almost be a piece of contemporary art, rather than a tool of political struggle. Overlooked by a mango tree heavy with blushing fruit, a rope is strung across Avenida Sucre as&#8230; <a href=\"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/2018\/02\/22\/maduro-trying-to-keep-power\/\">Read more &raquo;<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":36,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1358","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-article"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1358","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/36"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1358"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1358\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1359,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1358\/revisions\/1359"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1358"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1358"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/baileyonlineclassroom.com\/theamericasblog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1358"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}