ISIS is losing ground in Syria and Iraq. In Mosul, the Iraqi Army seems to be soundly defeating its insurgent opponents. The liberation of cities such as Palmyra, Aleppo, and Al-Bab in Syria, and Mosul and Fallujah in Iraq, show the terrorist group is on the desperate defense. The Iraqi Army’s push into Mosul supported by US and coalition airstrikes, specifically documents the last-ditch suicide attacks and other insurgent tactics employed by ISIS to only delay the inevitable victory there. By any reasonable account, this should be cause for hope and optimism- that the end is near.
By any realistic account, on the other hand, our optimism should be tempered by understanding the new psychology this situation places on ISIS leadership. ISIS is rapidly resembling a wild animal backed into a corner- a beast that will ferociously lash out. This has manifested itself recently in a variety of ways.
Firstly, ISIS is increasing its attacks across the Middle East. The group wants to retain the appearance of power and more importantly, extract fear (and thus, reluctant obedience) from across the Middle East and North Africa. Insurgents attacked Egyptian military forces in Sinai this week with roadside bombs, killing ten, including three officers. Pockets of fighting continue in Libya, despite US airstrikes. ISIS wants to remind these states of the consequences for fighting them by supporting their enemies in Syria and Iraq.
Secondly, ISIS has renewed lone-wolf attacks in the West, including Europe and the United States. ISIS has encouraged its members abroad, radicalized through social media, to continue lone-wolf attacks (usually suicidal) that they can take credit for afterwards. Recently we saw the unfortunate murder of four British citizens on Westminster Bridge and in the British parliament building. ISIS’s desperate situation has become a dangerous incentive to commit more acts of terror in the West. Radicalized members in the West have been given the motivation to carry out these atrocities- avenging their fallen brothers in Iraq and Syria. This may only increase as the final nails are laid in the caliphate’s coffin. To maintain its control and political power in the West, ISIS must encourage more and more frequent and more lethal attacks in the West. Thankfully, however, lone-wolves are not especially organized or well-planned, and are not likely to inflict as many casualties as predominated attacks such as 9/11, the 7/7 bombings, or the Bataclan attack in Paris- though this is only a token consolation.
Ultimately, the fall of ISIS will not mean the end of violence or religious extremism in the Middle East. Long term solutions such as education, social change, and even religious reform will required to deal effectively with the latter, while the key issues of the Syrian Civil War and Iraqi unrest- dating back to the Arab Spring and the 2003 US invasion, respectively- will need to finally be directly addressed after ISIS has been eliminated. The questions remain: whether Assad should remain in power, whether he should retain his chemical stockpiles, whether Russia should continue its interference in Syria, whether the Kurds should have an independent state, and whether the Iraqi heterogenous democracy can survive without being broken into a three-state solution. Until these are answered, we must curb our enthusiasm.