https://iwpr.net/global-voices/how-russia-weaponised-gas-deliveries-moldova
Russia has compelled the western European country of Moldova into entering a five year deal on the importation of gas in an effort to reaffirm their trade relationship in response to the new pro-European government in Moldova that was instituted in July 2021. This deal would cut the price per 1,000 cubic meters in half to about 450 US dollars. Still, the price offered in the deal is much higher than the average import price of gas in Moldova from the last decade which was around 270 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters. Gazprom, the largest gas corporation in Russia, has also been pressing for a lasting deal to secure the 709 million dollars owed to them by Moldova. The Gazprom spokesperson on October 23 gave Moldova the dire ultimatum of receiving no gas deliveries until December 1st or paying back their debt to the company in full. Throughout the month of October, Gazprom delivered only 2/3s of Moldova’s usual gas supply which forced the country into a 30 day state of emergency where gas had to be bought internationally at much steeper prices.
Normally, I think Russia taking this kind of action would be a big concern for the rest of Western European countries not part of the EU because they have a lot less security in their gas supply than EU countries, which all have the benefit of the free trade agreements that have been made with the EU. Moldova on its own is a much easier economic target to manipulate than the entirety of the EU because of the massive economic backlash that the EU is capable of instigating should a country provoke its member states enough. However, Moldova’s gas-powered electric system is deeply entangled with the highly contested breakaway region of Transnistria, with approximately 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity generated by Cuciurgan power plant in Transnistria. It is not in Russia’s interest to stop supplying Transnistria with gas because control of the region has been in somewhat of a limbo ever since it declared itself an independent state, triggering the Transnistrian War of 1992. The state of the region is still being negotiated today. Russia does not want to lose the reliance that Transnistria has on Russian gas imports because it acts as a foothold for Russia’s economic influence in Transnistria. Russia believes it should have more involvement in Transnistria and its affairs due to the majority Russian-speaking population in the unrecognized state and this stands in the way of any reductions Russia might make in the gas it supplies to the region. And as long as the current amount of gas in Transnistria remains stable, 80 percent of Moldova’s electricity is secured. On account of this, combined with the publicly announced disapproval of the EU, it is likely that Russia will not be able to escalate its pressure on Moldova much further without upsetting the balance and driving Moldova to find a supply of gas elsewhere, thereby affecting Transnistria and this Russia does not want.
This is an issue of Russia exercising its economic power over Moldova and the pushback from Europe to limit Russia’s power in Western Europe. It is a prime example of how economic power is used much more commonly now than outright military force or even the threat of military force to domineer other countries into submission. This gradual shift of economics and economic connections replacing other forms of influence as the most important power that a state can possess is a sign of the relative peace of the modern era, and shows that countries are choosing to take options that result in economic consequences over direct physical consequences.